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Abstract Some aspects concerning the controversial issue of birth-control and family planning 
as described and prescribed by Muslim authorities are yet to be investigated. A short treatise by a 
twentieth century traditional Muslim scholar and Sufi master provides the opportunity to address 
this topic, exploring the ways traditional authorities in the past and present have outlined the clues 
for providing an orthodox yet surprisingly accommodating answer vis-à-vis a topic of utmost actual-
ity in contemporary society.
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A recent article in the Times of India reports that after a delay of more 
than one year, in February 2015 the Indian government will finally release 
the data from the 2011 Census of India concerning the religious affilia-
tion of the country’s rapidly growing population. The reluctance of the 
government to publish this specific kind of data (those concerning other 
areas have long been made public!) suggests how religious affiliation is 
still regarded as a highly charged political and social issue in a country 
which, while gaining political independence in 1947, was to pass through 
the traumatic experience of being partitioned on religious grounds. With 
sensibilities running especially high among members of the two biggest, 
i.e. Hindu and Muslim, communities, the delay in publishing the data is 
attributed by most commentators to the fear among Indian politicians that 
a likely further shift in the ratio between the country’s minority Muslim 
population against the majority Hindu community would raise concerns 
and potentially cause social tensions, especially in view of a string of elec-
tions in federal states with a strong Muslim presence (68.3% in Jammu 
& Kashmir, 34.2% in Assam). In fact, the unofficial data pertaining to 
the Census published by the Indian Express would confirm that, among 
other things, the ratio between the two communities has yet again seen a 
decrease of the percentage of Hindus (78.35% as compared to 80.45% in 
2001 and 84.1% during the country’s first census in 1951) against a small 
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but steady increase of the percentage of Muslims (14.2% as compared to 
13.4% in 2001, and 9.8% in 1951, that is, shortly after independence) in 
the country’s overall population.
Against this background, the present article intends to address the 
closely related issue of birth control and family-planning which, in the 
South Asian context in general and in India in particular, has a long and 
often painful history going as far back as the early 1950’s. However, rather 
than focusing on its social, medical and political aspects, which since 
the former Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi’s campaign of coercive 
sterilization during the 1975-77 emergency have kept making national and 
international headlines, it wants to investigate some aspects concerning 
the delicate and controversial issue of birth-control and contraception as 
described and prescribed by Muslim textual authority. Seeking inspiration 
from a short yet concise and authoritative treatise written by a twentieth 
century Indian Muslim scholar and Sufi master, the aim is to explore the 
ways Muslim authorities in the past and the present have provided the 
clues for defining an orthodox (from an Islamic point of view) yet some-
times surprisingly modern, flexible and accommodating answer vis-à-vis 
a topic of utmost actuality in India and in contemporary society at large. 
Scrutinizing some of the statements and opinions expressed by scholarly 
experts in the course of the history of Islam, both inside and outside South 
Asia, it emerges that whereas the views held by the learned scholars and 
jurists are often subtle and nuanced leaving space for interpretation, other 
aspects are addressed in an almost unequivocal fashion. They hence con-
tradict the widespread perception of a monolithic Islam the authority of 
which is far too frequently believed to rely on the literal (mis-) interpreta-
tions of the primary textual sources (i.e. Qur’ān and Sunna) promulgated 
by numerous self-declared authorities. 
For most of us, the issues of birth-control and family planning are con-
cepts associated with modernity, affecting the lives of individuals, couples 
and families in contemporary societies increasingly dominated by Western 
values and a materialistic approach to life. By contrast, nothing seems 
to be so openly and willingly in contrast with modernity than Islam, too 
frequently depicted as a conservative and restrictive religion incapable 
of innovating itself and adjusting to the requirements of the changing 
times. It may therefore come as a surprise to many that a traditional Sufi 
authority better known for his intellectual elaborations on doctrinal issues 
pertaining to the esoteric science may have chosen to focus his attention 
on such kind of topic. And yet, Shāh Abū’l-Ḥasan Zaid Fārūqī (1906-1993), 
a renowned spiritual authority (shaikh) in the Indian branch of the Naqsh-
bandiyya, the Mujaddidiyya, a Sufi order whose authorities are best known 
for their strict Sunni interpretation of both the spiritual path (ṭarīqa) and 
its legal foundation (sharī‘a), has sought it useful and necessary to express 
his opinion at this regard, probably not by mere coincidence at a time 
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when the Indian government had begun to actively promote both male and 
female sterilization as part of the official family planning program in the 
mid 60’s of the past century. As becomes clear from the opening pages of 
the treatise, the text was originally intended as a reply to a legal enquiry 
(mustaftī) by Sayyid Niẓām al-Dīn Aḥmad Kāẓimī, a member of Delhi’s 
‘ālim community, concerning the legitimacy for Muslims in the present 
historical conditions (fasād-i zamāna) and according to the requirements 
of modern times (ẓarūrat-i waqt) of resorting to contraception (mān‘-i 
ḥaml) and adhering to the government-promoted schemes of family plan-
ning (khāndānī manṣūba-bandī) (Abū’l-Ḥasan 1969, p. 7). The articulated 
answer to this query was eventually expanded to become a separate, short 
treatise on the issue bearing the title Masla-i ḍabt-i wilādat (The Problem 
of Birth Control). Its first edition was published in Safar 1388/May 1968 
in 3,000 copies which were sent out to a range of traditional Muslim 
scholars and academics in India and in neighbouring Pakistan. Touching 
on a very sensitive issue, it yielded an immediate response from many of 
the recipients who, although in some cases disagreeing with the author’s 
conclusions, on the whole reacted positively to the scholarly initiative by 
the respected Naqshbandī shaikh and ‘ālim. Some of these opinions and 
reactions have been collected and included in the book’s second edition 
which was published only a few months later in Dhū’l-Ḥijja 1388/February 
1969. Useful as a reference vis-à-vis an issue of utmost actuality at the time 
of publication, which saw the Muslim community compelled to pronounce 
itself in the light of the policy of family-planning aggressively promoted 
by the Indian government during those years, the author carefully avoids 
any hint to the social and political dimension of the problem, something 
that lies outside his scope. As he himself declares in the opening pages 
of the second edition, the intention behind the publication of the text was 
solely of a scholarly nature attempting to shed some light on the juridical, 
i.e. legal groundings of this issue.
On the other hand, books and treatises specifically addressing the topic 
of birth-control and family-planning were not unprecedented in twentieth 
century Muslim India. Already in the mid-1930’s, the influential and con-
troversial Muslim leader Sayyid Abū’l-Alā Maudūdī (1903-1979) wrote 
extensively on the subject, publishing his thoughts in serialized form in the 
Tarjumān al Qur’ān, a monthly journal concerned with religious and social 
issues edited during those years by him and his brother from Hyderabad 
(Deccan). This series was subsequently published in book form in 1943 
and again, in a revised edition, in 1962 from Lahore in what by then had 
become West-Pakistan. Although neither a trained theologian nor a quali-
fied jurist, Maudūdī ventured into a theological discussion to corroborate 
his strong opposition to any form of birth-control and contraception. In 
his opinion, this policy was part of a Western plot against Islam aimed 
at promoting the dissolution of the traditional social disorder, the imple-
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mentation of which would eventually lead to moral degeneration, sexual 
promiscuity and licentiousness (Maudūdī 1962, p. 79). He takes up the tra-
ditional argument that the gift of procreation and sustenance (and hence 
also the inability of procreation) pertains to the realm of Allāh’s exclusive 
prerogatives, quoting in his support the Qur’anic verses since long cited by 
those opposed to contraception: is there a Creator, other than God, to give 
you sustenance from heaven or earth? (Sūrat al-fāṭir, Koran 35,3); and: 
There is no moving creature on earth but its sustenance dependeth on God 
(Sūrat al-Hūd, Koran 11,6), and: Lost are those who slay their children, 
from folly, without knowledge, and forbid food which God hath provided 
for them, inventing lies for God (Sūrat al-an‘ām, Koran 6,140). Many years 
later, the controversy stirred up by Maudūdī’s contribution to the discus-
sion in Pakistan eventually led to the temporary proscription, in 1966, of 
his book by the government of Pakistan, a decision which, however, was 
soon after to be revoked. It nevertheless demonstrates the lasting actuality 
of the problem and at the same time indicates the popularity of Maudūdī’s 
way of addressing the issue.
More recently, the contrasting opinions expressed by the two chief 
muftīs of Delhi, the present shāhī imām of the city’s historical Shāhjahānī 
Jama‘ Masjid, Sayyid Aḥmad Bukhārī and Muftī Mukarram Aḥmad, since 
1971 head imām of the Fatehpuri Masjid and himself a recognized author-
ity in the Naqshbandī-Mujaddidī order, are indicative of the persistence 
of different stances on the subject among influential Muslim scholars in 
India even today. Whereas the former has repeatedly stressed the incom-
patibility of family-planning with the values of traditional Islam, the latter 
takes a more balanced stance asserting the need for Muslims to adopt a 
middle way in life which would take into account what is in practical sense 
achievable in the present-day circumstances (Weigl 2010, p. 211). Mukar-
ram’s position on contraception is hence more differentiated than that of 
his more politically-oriented contemporary, as he makes a distinction be-
tween permanent and temporary measures of contraception, pronouncing 
himself against the use of the former, but allowing for the conditional use 
of the latter. Such point of view, as we shall see, comes closer to that held 
by Shāh Abū’l-Ḥasan himself, and reflects an approach to the topic based 
on scholarly investigation of the available textual sources.
The statements made by Muftī Mukarram Aḥmad suggest the underly-
ing complexity of the topic of family-planning, contraception and birth-
control. As so often happens in Islam in absence of a central authority for 
the interpretation of the primary textual sources, the issue of birth control 
and family-planning is defined by contrasting views and positions among 
the learned interpreters (mujtahid) of the Law. With the proliferation of 
modern techniques of contraception, the fundamental question arises as to 
which of these should be outrightly rejected as unlawful (ḥarām) and which 
qualify for closer investigation and, once these are identified, whether 
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the sharī‘a considers birth control (ḍabt al-wilādat) and its range of meth-
ods as permissible (jā’iz) or not, whether it is permissible within certain 
limits or whether it should be regarded as altogether unlawful (ḥarām). 
The position held by some conservative authorities is that in Islam there 
is no room at all for birth control. Based on the authority of the Qur’anic 
verse: Kill not your children for fear of want: We shall provide sustenance 
for them as well as for you. Verily, the killing of them is a great sin (Sūrat 
al-asrā, Koran 17,31), they assert, in an altogether similar fashion to that 
of Maudūdī, that it is impossible for a pious Muslim to resort to any kind 
of practice apt at impeding the course of a divinely prearranged plan 
or destiny, hence the intervention of human decision to intervene in the 
course of nature is interpreted as an unlawful limitation of God’s power 
(qudrat). It is precisely in view of the contrasting opinions encountered 
among different strains of Muslim authorities in the present as well as in 
the past on one side and the desire of many common Muslims to receive 
an answer to their doubts and queries on the other that Shāh Abū’l-Ḥasan 
Zaid Fārūqī has deemed it useful and necessary to investigate the issue 
in some detail. Collecting a considerable amount of material taken from 
a variety of sources, he refers to a range of authoritative scholarly texts 
compiled over the centuries in order to investigate and illustrate the issue 
of birth control from a traditional and orthodox, that is juridical (fiqhī), 
point of view. 
If considered within the context of traditional sciences, the problem 
of birth-control falls within the realm of fiqh or Islamic jurisprudence, 
whose authorities (fuqahā, plural of faqīh) are responsible for the cor-
rect interpretation (ijtihād) of the Divine law (sharī‘a). With concern to 
the issue of birth-control, Shāh Abū’l-Ḥasan, in a truly scholarly fashion 
that distinguishes a faqīh, begins his discussion by declaring that even 
though the term birth-control (ḍabt al-wilādat) is in itself a new one, not 
encountered among the ‘ulamā and fuqahā’ of the past, the necessity 
to apply such unprecedented, modern terminology to an old concept is 
not to be deemed reproachable (lā mushāḥat fī’l-istilāḥī) (Abū’l-Ḥasan 
1969, p. 8). Yet, many of the methods of contraception are in one way or 
the other mentioned in the juridical reference works compiled over time 
whereas others, more specifically modern ones, have been addressed by 
contemporary authorities. Thus is established that the source (aṣl) moving 
the reasoning on the use of contraceptives among Muslim scholars is the 
established practice of ‘azl.
It is generally agreed upon by scholars of Islam that the most acceptable 
(and hence widely used) method of birth-control and contraception (man‘ 
al-ḥaml) is that known as ‘azl. The term derives from the Arabic verbal root 
‘a-za-la, meaning ‘to put away or aside’, hence: removal, dismissal. In the 
specific context, it indicates the coitus interruptus, a practice well-known 
in ancient Arabia the use of which is attested since pre-Islamic times. Nu-
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merous prophetic Traditions (aḥādith, plural of ḥadīth) confirming its ac-
ceptance by the prophet of Islam are included in the canonical collections 
of prophetic Traditions. The Saḥīḥain of al-Bukhārī and Muslim and the 
Sunan collections all contain explicit references to it and the four canonical 
schools of Sunni Law (madhāhib, plural of madhhab), i.e. Ḥanafī, Malikī, 
Shāfi’ī and Ḥanbalī, all have addressed the issue in their authoritative 
manuals. According to the heads of these four schools, i.e. Abū Ḥanīfa 
(80/699-148/767), Mālik ibn Anas (93/711-179/795), Muḥammad al-Shāfi’ī 
(150/767-204/820) and Aḥmad ibn Hanbal (164/780-241/855), the practice 
of ‘azl is either permissible (jā’iz) or neutral (mubāḥ). Although opinions 
vary as to the circumstances in which ‘azl can or should be practiced, 
there is a general consensus among the experts in canonical Islamic law 
(fuqahā, plural of faqīh) to declare the practice of ‘azl as a lawful means 
of birth-control and contraception. The practice of ‘azl is considered to be 
part of the so-called barrier or temporary/accidental methods (‘ārḍī ṣūrat), 
in contrast with the permanent methods of contraception (dā’imī ṣūrat). 
The former include also the most popular contraceptive used in modern 
times, i.e. condoms which, in a sense must be considered as a modern 
evolution of the ancient technique of ‘azl. 
Perhaps, the scholar who has treated the topic of birth-control in great-
est detail is the renowned theologian, jurist and Sufi Abū Ḥamīd al-Ghazālī 
(450/1058-505/1111) in his opus magnus, the Iḥyā ‘ulūm al-Dīn (Revival 
of the Religious Sciences). To testify the reliance of many Sufi-oriented 
authorities, both of the past and at present, on the elaborations of this 
outstanding Muslim scholar, Shāh Abū’l-Ḥasan includes an entire chapter, 
albeit not written by himself but by his close friend Maulānā Qāḍī Sajjād 
Ḥusain, then head of the Madrasa ‘Āliya at Delhi’s Fatepuri mosque, to 
explaining al-Ghazālī’s viewpoint on this issue. This chapter reiterates 
the well-known stance by the Shāfi‘ī jurist al-Ghazālī who in principle 
agrees that the matter of impregnation should be left with God alone, but 
would allow for it in case of economic constraints on the side of the man 
who practices it. Such a position is seen by Abū’l-Ḥasan and Qāḍī Sajjād 
Ḥusain as what they describe as a pre-modern concession to modernity 
that clearly goes against the argument that by acting with intention in 
mind (niyya) one violates one of the basic principles of Islam, i.e. the trust 
in God for sustenance sanctioned by a series of frequently cited Qur’anic 
passages. As with concern to the apparent contradiction resulting from 
the statement which on one side condemns the practice of ‘azl as ‘secret 
infanticide’ and on the other declares its definition as minor infanticide 
as wrong, al-Ghazālī, who generally accepts ‘azl as a permissible practice 
notes that the use of the term ‘secret infanticide’ in this context has to 
be intended equivalent to the phrase dissimulation is concealed infidelity 
(shirk al-khafī), which would indicate a sense of aversion and detestation 
(karāhat) for such practice on behalf of the prophet. Aversion, al-Ghazālī 
ISSN 2385-3042 Annali di Ca’ Foscari. Serie orientale, 52, pp. 81-98
Dähnhardt. Divine Sanction and Human Intervention 87
argues, manifests itself on the occasion of prohibiting something (taḥrīm), 
when purifying oneself from an impurity (tanzīha) or as a result of neglect 
of the inner virtues. Hence, for him to resort to its practice it is respect-
able, not to practice it is better and the third meaning evinced from it is 
that to practice ‘azl preserves the inner virtue and excellence (faḍīlat) of a 
person. He explains the apparent contradiction as something undesirable 
(makrūḥ), but not out rightly forbidden (Abū’l-Ḥasan 1969, pp. 12-13).
Yet another scholar of the past who has dedicated much attention to the 
question of birth-control was the Ḥanbali jurist from Syria, Ibn Qayyim 
Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Jawzīya (d. 751/1350). In his Zād al-ma‘ād 
fī hadi khair al-‘ibād (Provisions of the Hereafter on the Teachings of the 
Best of All People), Ibn Jawzīya has collected what is perhaps the largest 
amount of prophetical Traditions deemed authentic (ṣaḥīḥ) on the issue of 
‘azl. The majority of these seem to corroborate the view that Muḥammad 
considered this practice lawful (ḥalāl) and permissible (jawāz). However, 
Shāh Abū’l-Ḥasan also cites Ibn Jawzīya as reporting that some among 
the learned scholars of Islam consider it forbidden (ḥarām) on the au-
thority of the often quoted ḥadīth listed by Muslim in his Saḥīḥ, in which 
the prophet Muḥammad apparently declared the practice of ‘azl as being 
tantamount to burying a child alive: then they asked him about [the prac-
tice of] ‘azl, whereupon he replied: «That is the secret [way of] burying 
[it] (dhalika al-wadu al-khafī)», whereas ‘Abd Allāh ibn Mas‘ūd, one of the 
earliest converts to Islam and among the most intimate companions of the 
prophet (ṣaḥāba), reportedly defined this practice it as minor infanticide 
(al-maw’ūdat al-ṣughrā).
The view that any kind of contraception is to be regarded as ḥarām has 
been strongly endorsed by a group of Muslim scholars around the Anda-
lusian philosopher, theologian and jurist Ibn Ḥazm (384/994-456/1064), 
probably the best known opponent of contraception among the ‘ulamā of 
the classical age. Ibn Ḥazm condemns all kinds of contraception includ-
ing ‘azl, judging them as being equivalent to infanticide on the basis of 
the above mentioned prophetic Traditions which, he asserts, although 
less in number as compared to those in which he apparently condoned or 
even allowed for practicing ‘azl, refer to a later period in the prophet’s 
life and must be considered as having been abrogated, for Muḥammad’s 
later statements hence represent his true opinion (Atighetchi 2007, pp. 
79-80). As well-presented the argument of these scholars may appear, 
Abū’l-Ḥasan comments, this position was never shared by the majority of 
authorities of the time and has emerged more powerfully only in relatively 
recent times, during the time of the merging reform movements. They be-
come particularly articulated in the views of the renowned Indian expert 
of prophetic traditions (muḥaddith) Shāh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz (1159/1746-1824), 
the eldest and most prominent son of the great scholar and sufi Shāh Walī 
Allāh, as voiced in his Fatāwā-yi-‘azīzī (Abū’l-Ḥasan 1969, p. 54). However, 
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Ibn Jawzīya in his own right comes to the conclusion that it is impossible 
to compare the above mentioned ḥadīth against the reported claim made 
by ‘Abd Allāh ibn Mas‘ūd. To support his view, he quotes the following 
authentic (ṣaḥīḥ) Tradition reported by al-Tirmidhī which explicitly con-
tradicts the juxtaposition of the practice of coitus interruptus with that of 
minor infanticide: Jabīr ibn ‘Abd Allāh narrated: «Oh messenger of Allāh! 
We practice ‘azl, but the Jews claim that it is minor infanticide.» So he 
said: «The Jews lie. When Allāh wants to create it, nothing can prevent 
Him». Thus, Abū’l-Ḥasan agrees favourably with Ibn Jawzīya that judging 
by this authoritative Tradition alone, Islam would appear to set itself in 
net contrast with Jewish law which strictly prohibits the practice of coitus 
interruptus (cf. Gen. 38,9-10). 
In order to lend support to this position, al-Jawzīya, Imām Kamāl al-Dīn 
ibn al-Humām (d. 861/1457) and Mullā ‘Alī Qārī (d. 1014/1605) all cite 
a ḥadīth which relates the story of a discussion during which ‘Umar ibn 
al-Khattāb (581-644), ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (599-661), Zubair ibn al-‘Awāmm 
(594-656), Sa‘d Ibn Abī Waqqāṣ (595-674) and other companions of the 
prophet (ṣaḥāba) were present when the issue of ‘azl was raised. All com-
panions agreed that there was no harm in practicing it. When one among 
the present raised the objection that some people consider this practice as 
equivalent to minor infanticide (maw’ūda al-ṣughrā), ‘Alī is said to have re-
plied: «Until the foetus will not pass through seven stages [of development] 
(Ar.: iṭwār, pl. of ṭaur), it cannot be considered infanticide». ‘Ali is then 
reported to have recited the famous Qur’anic verses, in which the gradual 
development of a human being inside a woman’s womb is described in a 
very poetical and suggestive fashion: Man We did create from a quintes-
sence (of clay); then We placed him as (a drop of) sperm in a place of 
rest, firmly fixed; then We made the sperm into a clot of congealed blood; 
then of that clot We made a lump (foetus); then We made out of that lump 
bones and clothed the bones with flesh; then we developed out of it an-
other creature. So blessed be God, the best to create (Sūrat al-mu’minūn, 
Koran 23,12-14). ‘Ali then went on explaining to the others present in the 
discussion that first there was a quintessence of clay (sulālat), then a drop 
of sperm (nuṭfat), then a clot of congealed blood (‘alqat), then a lump of 
flesh (fetus, mudhghat) and finally another creature (khalqan). On hearing 
this explanation, ‘Umar is said to have praised ‘Alī wishing him that Allāh 
may increase his life span. 
On the basis of the quoted Qur’anic verse, ‘Alī has thus been able to ex-
plain that it is not possible to define the practice of preventing the man’s 
sperm from flowing into the woman’s womb as ‘child burial’ since a new 
human being cannot be possibly defined as such before going through 
all the above mentioned seven evolutionary stages. By transferring and 
adapting this logical deduction to the more contemporary issue of abortion 
or voluntary interruption of pregnancy (isqāṭī ḥaml), most contemporary 
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‘ulamā have declared that abortion is permissible until the foetus has 
reached the age of 120 days. It is permissible to abort until 120 days after 
conception, since until that moment the foetus is not fully developed and 
hence its killing cannot be regarded as infanticide. To support this argu-
ment, the following Tradition is cited: [The Creation of] a human being is 
put together in the womb of the mother in forty days, then he becomes 
a clot of thick blood for a similar period, and then a piece of flesh for a 
similar period. Then Allāh sends an angel who is ordered to write four 
things... then the soul is breathed into him. As we can see from the just 
quoted authoritative ḥadīth, Islamic tradition considers the amount of time 
of three times forty day for a total of 120 days or roughly three months, 
as the period required for the foetus to develop into a human being which 
corresponds to approximately the same period considered by legislation in 
most Western countries as the limit within which abortion can be legally 
practiced. Hanafi legal opinion, to which our Sufi author subscribes, allows 
abortion provided it is done within 120 days after impregnation.
Since there are no explicit statements in the Qur’ān concerning the 
permissibility or impermissibility of ‘azl, most scholars tend to take into 
account the variables involved while making recourse to this practice, such 
as the conditions of each individual and/or family and changing historical 
circumstances. A ḥadīth related by Abū Huraira and reported by Ibn Mājah 
says: Do not use ‘azl with your wife without her permission. The classical 
position taken by most juridic schools (madhāhab, plural of madhhab) is 
to consider ‘azl lawful if practiced with the consent of the wife. If the four 
imām of the principal legal schools of Sunni Islam have agreed on declar-
ing the practice of ‘azl as ultimately permissible, this permission appears 
however to have been made conditional on the consent of the wife (tazi‘-i 
nuṭfa, lit.: spoiling of the sperm) whose sexual satisfaction must be guar-
anteed and safeguarded if recourse to ‘azl is to be made and without which 
‘azl is not permissible (Abū’l-Ḥasan 1969, pp. 18-19).
In view of the deteriorating conditions of time, the reasons put forward 
for abolishing the original condition of seeking one’s wife consent appears 
reasonable and well pondered. At this regard, Abū’l-Ḥasan reminds the 
reader of the event described in the Qur’anic chapter of the Cave (Sūrat al-
kahf, Koran 18) concerning Moses and his mysterious companion endowed 
with divinely inspired science (‘ilm al-ladunnī), which most esoteric tradi-
tions agree to identify with Ḥaḍrat Khiḍr. When during their common jour-
ney they met a young man who was slain by Khiḍr, Moses said: Hast thou 
slain an innocent person who had slain none? (Koran 18,74). On which, 
Ḥaḍrat Khiḍr explained to him: «As for the youth, his parents were people 
of faith, and we feared that he would grieve them by obstinate rebellion 
and ingratitude» (Koran 18,80). In a typical Sufi fashion, Shāh Abū’l-Ḥasan 
observes that the same way Ḥaḍrat Khiḍr acted on the order of his Lord 
when he killed the undutiful and wicked (nā-khalaf) boy in order to prevent 
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the blindness caused by the love his father and mother nourished for him 
to lead to their ruin and death, that same way the learned and savant have 
applied their subtle discernment and mildness of heart for the sake of the 
Muslim ‘umma. Hence, the final verdict that in these times of increasing 
corruption and moral decline, in which the chance that one’s own children 
turn against their parents has become a real danger, there is no more need 
to guarantee the satisfaction of one’s wife in sexual intercourse, but the 
practice of ‘azl is permissible for the sole sake of preventing pregnancy, 
without any further condition (Abū’l-Ḥasan 1969, p. 21).
Ibn Humām has supported this view in his writings and Ibn ‘Ābidīn 
quotes two conditions to support his stance on ‘azl, i.e. that both husband 
and wife be either on a long journey or find themselves in a non-muslim 
country (dār al-ḥarb). He, Tahtawī and al-Mas‘ūd declare, moreover, that 
it is permissible for women to close the mouth of their uterus (raḥim) in 
order to prevent them for becoming pregnant without seeking the consent 
of their husband (Abū’l-Ḥasan 1969, p. 17).
The third method falling into the category of accidental measures of 
contraception is that of observing the rhythm of time (maḥfūḍ zamāna 
kī ri‘āyat), that is, to limit sexual intercourse to those days during which 
the women’s womb is not receptive to impregnation, a technique known 
in to modern Western science as Ogino Knauss method. And again, the 
permissible methods of contraception include the use of the contraceptive 
pill (mān‘a–i haml golī), although in the case of this latter it is necessary 
to seek the advice of an expert medical doctor in order to prevent the 
woman’s health from being affected by any harm or damage (Abū’l-Ḥasan 
1969, p. 21).
To sum it up, to resort to these accidental and temporary methods of 
contraception without any dislike or aversion is permissible. According to 
both scholars of the past (mutaqadamīn) and the present (muta’ākhirīn) it 
is permissible without any objection to be practiced by reciprocal consent 
in the couple. According to most scholars of the modern period, even if 
practiced by any one member of the couple without seeking the consent 
of the other these methods are permissible, because of the worsening 
conditions of the time, in order to prevent an uncontrolled increase in a 
family’s progeny.
The principal permanent or irreversible (dā’imī) methods of birth con-
trol are male sterilization (mard kī nasbandī) or vasectomy and women 
sterilization (‘aml jarrāhī), consisting of hysterectomy or tubal legation. 
These are modern techniques of birth-control unknown in ancient times, 
hence no reference to them is found in the primary sources of authority 
in Islam, neither in the Qur’ān nor in the Sunna nor among the ‘ulamā of 
the pre-modern period. 
Those opposed to the practice of male sterilization quote the Qur’anic 
verses already mentioned in the context of Maudūdī’s argument: There is 
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no moving creature on earth but its subsistence dependeth on God (Sūrat 
Hūd, Koran 11,6), but also: And in Heaven is your subsistence, as that 
which ye are promised (Sūrat al-dhāriyāt, Koran 51,22) in support of their 
view. And the Prophet has said: Marry the child-bearing, loving woman for 
I shall outnumber the peoples by you on the Day of Resurrection (ḥadīth 
narrated in Sunan Abū Dā’ūd and al-Nasā‘ī1) that is to say: the Muslim com-
munity will excel over the other communities because of the abundance of 
its progeny. These textual references are used to derive the incumbency on 
every Muslim to make every effort to increase the number of his offspring, 
so as to contribute to the excellency, prosperity and happiness of the Mus-
lim ‘umma over all other communities. They argue that those who resort to 
male sterilization because of economic constraints and indigence thereby 
show his lack of reliance and trust upon God, whereas it is incumbent not 
to nourish any doubt as with regard to His sustenance. For surely, God is 
He Who gives all Sustenance (Sūrat al-dhāriyāt, Koran 51,58) and surely, 
the prosperity and multitude of the community of the messenger of Allāh 
is desirable. There can be doubt in this, and yet there are some aspects 
which must be investigated before reaching a definite verdict.
Allāh has established numerous rules and causes for this ephemeral 
world, to disregard and turn away from these is against the sunna and 
the ways commanded by Him. That precisely was the bond between Him 
and His messenger and in His treasure-house there will never ever be any 
want, even if many people fail to understand this, for notwithstanding all 
this, He has commanded: Make not thy hand tied to thy neck, nor stretch 
it forth to its utmost reach, so that thou become blameworthy and desti-
tute. Verily, thy Lord doth provide sustenance and abundance for whom 
He pleaseth, and He provideth in a just measure. For He doth know and 
regard all His servants (Sūrat al-isrā, Koran 17,29-30).
By contrast, according to Shāh Abū’l-Ḥasan (1969) in absence of clear 
evidence for these practices in the original sources, the contemporary 
‘ulamā have formulated their legal opinions and judgments through deduc-
tive analogy (qiyās), a process also called deduction (istinbāṭ) or derivation 
(istikhrāj). He identifies three major positions held at this regard. 
The first holds that sterilization is tantamount to permanent castration 
(ikhtiṣā’), since both irrevocably prevent the possibility of impregnation. 
To adopt this view cannot be corroborated by the fact alone that the tes-
ticles (khuṣya) are permanently removed, for a castrated man (khaṣī or 
ākhta) cannot have regular sexual intercourse (Arabic: mubāsharat, Urdu: 
ham-bastarī), whereas for a person that has undergone sterilization the 
situation is indeed different, since such a person preserves his viral power 
(quwwat-i mardī) intact and is hence able to maintain sexual relations 
1 Al-Sunan al-sughrā, Kitāb al-nikāḥ, in Siddiqui 1994, 2, 1, p. 314. 
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with his wife as before. Male sterilization intended as vasectomy does not 
imply the removal of any part of the body, involves the bilateral disruption 
of the vas deferens, thereby preventing the expulsion of sperm from the 
penis and thus preventing impregnation of the sexual partner. By contrast, 
castration not only leads to the permanent perishing of the male sperm, 
it also brings about a remarkable decrease in virility. Therefore, argues 
Abū’l-Ḥasan, no analogy can be established between these two actions, 
there is a huge difference between them (Abū’l-Ḥasan 1969, pp. 22-29).
The second view holds that the practice of sterilization amounts to an 
intentional alteration in God’s creation (taghīr al-khalq) and must therefore 
be regarded as sinful. Those who subscribe to this point of view assert that 
to resort to such method openly contradicts what is thus sanctioned in the 
Holy Book: But Shaiṭān said: «I will take of thy servants a portion marked 
off… And I will mislead them, and I will create in them false desires; I will 
order them to slit the ears of cattle, and to deface the fair nature created» 
(Sūrat al-nisā, Koran 4,118-119). This verse mentions a series of rituals 
currently practiced among the people of pre-Islamic Arabia, such as slit-
ting the ears of some animals, to mark, hurt or even deface them so as to 
make them easily recognizable since they have been released for the sake 
of the (false) gods. And some of them did not release them, so in order to 
please Satan they altered the creation of God (Abū’l-Ḥasan 1969, pp. 13-
15). But what does it actually mean to alter the creation of Allāh? There is 
some controversy among the learned scholars at this regard. Some have 
interpreted it as meaning ‘intervention in the process God’s Creation’ 
(takhlīq), which by definition is a created and fabricated thing (āfrīnish). 
According to this interpretation, the slitting of the ears of those animals 
mentioned in the above mentioned Qur’anic verse occurs due to deception 
by shaiṭān, thus altering the body of the animals as they were originally 
created by God. Those who subscribe to this point of view consider the 
slitting of the ears by analogy an illegitimate intervention in God’s act of 
creation. As an example, Shāh Abū’l-Ḥasan quotes the opinion of Imām 
Mujāhid ibn Jabr (642-722 AD), author of one of the earliest commentaries 
(tafsīr) on the Qur’ān, according to whom to alter God’s creation implies an 
alteration in the true Divine Law (Dīn qayim), because this is the meaning 
clearly conveyed by the Qur’ān: So set you thy face steadily and truly to the 
faith: establish God’s handiwork according to the pattern on which He has 
made mankind: no change [let there be] in the work [wrought by God], that 
is the standard religion (Dīn qayim), but most among mankind understand 
not (Sūrat al-Rūm, Koran 30,30). According to Mujāhid (Tafsīr, as quoted 
by Abū’l-Ḥasan 1969, p. 17), the first verse should be interpreted as being 
introduced by: (Shaiṭān said:) I will deceive them so that they shall alter 
the true Dīn created by God. Hence, those who condemn the practice of 
sterilization as an act equivalent to the alteration of God’s creation accept 
this interpretation claiming that those who resort to such practice alter 
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God’s handiwork and the bodies born out of this creative process, judging 
it non-permissible (nā-jā’iz) and forbidden (ḥarām), and hence declaring it 
an undesirable act bordering with the forbidden (makrūh taḥrīmī). 
However, Abū’l-Ḥasan considers the proofs and contention of those who 
subscribe to this point of view as objectionable. First of all, he states, 
the interpretation and explanation advanced by those who advocate the 
unlawfulness of sterilization as a method of contraception reflects a po-
sition that is in between two positions which, if examined against each 
other, does not subsist, for there cannot subsist any truth in a position 
that contradicts itself. Second, the verse quoted refers to the evil inher-
ent to an alteration derived from the deception of shaiṭān and hence does 
not condemn universally any kind of alteration. To practice sterilization 
does not entail the removal of any bodily part, whereas, by contrast, the 
practice of circumcision (khatna) effectively implies the amputation of a 
bodily part and thus an intervention on God’s handiwork with permanent 
consequences. And yet, not only is circumcision not condemned, but is a 
recommended custom among Muslims since it is an act not perpetrated 
for the sake of shaiṭān but for the Most Merciful. Women have their ears 
and noses cut for the purpose of enhancing their beauty with ornaments 
such as earrings and nose rings, yet the sharī‘a allows this practice. 
Abū’l-Ḥasan (1969, pp. 14-15) goes then on to cite the nineteenth cen-
tury Syrian jurist Imām Ibn ‘Ābidīn al-Shāmī (1198/1783–1252/1836), who 
in his authoritative work on Ḥanafī fiqh titled Radd al-muḥtār ‘alā al-durr 
al-mukhtār is quoted as writing: 
Whatever action is accomplished for the benefit of God’s servants, if 
no harm derives from it, must be declared as permissible by analogy 
(qiyās). Hence, the ‘ulamā have declared the castration of animals for 
the benefit for men as permissible because it helps making the meat 
of these animals more tender and tasteful. In addition, it is a common 
practice among herdsmen to sign the animals of their flock with specific 
marks of distinction; they do it out of their own needs, not because of 
any deception by or for the sake of shaiṭān. On the bases of the above 
mentioned premises, these actions are not sinful, but according to the 
rules of the sharī‘a that according to necessity, those things which are 
forbidden become permissible (mubāḥ).
There derives that those who resort to sterilization do not act for the 
sake of pleasing shaiṭān, but because outer circumstances compel them 
to make recourse to it. Abū’l-Ḥasan develops the consequential reasoning 
that they supposedly do so because they feel that the progeny Allāh has 
already granted them as much as they can possibly bear and only with 
utmost difficulty they are capable of facing the expenses for their upbring-
ing, maintenance and education; and since they cannot possibly face the 
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expenses deriving from a further increase in progeny, any further child 
would cause great trouble to them forcing them to generate additional 
income through illegal means. Thus a real danger arises that they will get 
involved in activities that go against the decrees of Allāh thereby attract-
ing His wrath and anger and making shaiṭān happy. 
The reasoning adopted by Shāh Abū’l-Ḥasan here follows closely that of 
al-Ghazālī when he asserts that those who resort to the practice of steri-
lization do so simply because they are compelled to do so in order to pre-
vent themselves from being forced into a condition of economic constraint 
which they fell they cannot possibly bear. The condition of such a person 
hence, it is argued, falls into the category hinted art in several instances 
in the Qur’ān, thus lending support for such an attitude, as for instance: 
No burden do we place on any soul, but that which it can bear (Sūrat al-
a‘raf, Koran 7,42). For this reason, Shāh Abū’l-Ḥasan’s argument runs, it 
is impossible to include the practice of male sterilization among those that 
came into being through the deception of shaiṭān, for such a person acts 
so in order to protect himself from committing sins derived from his inca-
pacity to face the expenses for the upbringing of further children. His act 
cannot therefore be equivalent to those mentioned in the Qur’anic verse 
quoted above with regard to the infidel polytheists whose actions were 
born out of the deception of shaiṭān.
The third position on which Abū’l-Ḥasan elaborates is that which holds 
that the practice of sterilization entails the equivalence with the condi-
tion of male sterility or female barrenness, a condition referred to by the 
Arabic term ‘uqm (dryness), whereas those who cannot have/bear children 
are referred to as ‘aqīm/‘aqīma, as sanctioned by the Qur’anic verse: To 
God belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth. He creates what 
He wills. He bestows children male or female according to His will, or he 
bestows both males and females, and He leaves barren whom He will, for 
He is full of knowledge and power (Sūrat al-shūrā, Koran 42,49-50). For 
many people, as far as the result and the inherent quality of such action 
is concerned, sterilization amounts to artificially causing the condition of 
being sterile or barren. Whoever between husband and wife is sterile or 
barren cannot possibly beget children. There is neither anything malfunc-
tion nor apparently any deformation in their sexual organs (a‘zā), sexual 
relations between husband and wife remain outwardly unaffected by it. 
Those women who agree to undergo surgery for sterilization through and 
those men who agree to undergo surgery for vasectomy agree to become 
sterile and barren, so as to prevent them from having children. Apparently, 
it does not compromise in any way the relation between husband and wife. 
To conclude whether this method is to be judged, the jurists who dealt 
with this issue the question arose whether the capacity to bear children 
should be included among the divine favours (fuyūḍ, pl. of faiḍ) bestowed 
by God upon His creatures and one of the Divine attributes, and whether 
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those who opt for being sterilized hence put themselves in conflict with 
this favour. If so, this would be a clear sign of infidelity and, as such, re-
sult in being non-permissible. For Abū’l-Ḥasan, although this is true in a 
certain sense, it is necessary to reflect carefully before pronouncing one-
self, because whoever relinquishes any of the divine favours or willingly 
excludes himself from it, if not outrightly stupid, would be asked for the 
reason why he had done such a thing. If he comes up with a bad reason, 
then he is blameworthy for committing a bad act, but if he has done so 
for any good reason then he surely is not blameworthy, nay if he has done 
such a thing with an important purpose in mind this is rightful and laud-
able (mustaḥaqq). According to an authentic Tradition, the quality of an 
action depends on the intention and act of will behind it, on the basis of 
what is confirmed by a famous ḥadīth narrated on the authority of amīr 
al-mu’minīn Abū Ḥafs ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, who is reported as saying: 
I heard the messenger of Allāh say: «Actions are according to intentions 
(bi’l-niyyati), and everyone will get what was intended» (Umm 1999, ḥadīth 
1). And also: We did indeed offer the Trust to the heavens and the earth 
and the mountains: but they refused to undertake it, being afraid thereof: 
but man undertook it; he was indeed unjust and foolish (Sūrat al-ahzāb, 
Koran 33,72). Hence, after quoting these two powerful statements taken 
from the two primary sources of Islamic authority, Abū’l-Ḥasan concludes 
that a person that decides to undergo surgery for vasectomy cannot ap-
parently be neither unjust nor foolish, nor is his intention in any way evil, 
so why should he be judged as bad and evil?
Here yet again emerges the surprisingly flexible mental attitude by 
Shāh Abū’l-Ḥasan, the author of the treatise that provided us with the 
basis and background for the considerations on the issue of birth-control 
and contraception made in the present article. Although far from being 
exhaustive on an issue that would require far more space and expert at-
tention, it hopefully has been able to throw some light on the reasoning 
adopted by a respected ‘ālim who happens to be also a Sufi distinguished 
by a deep awareness of the human psyche. Thus, far from limiting himself 
to adopting the rigid categories of legalistic thinking, his procedure is per-
meated by that substratum of humanity that distinguishes those capable of 
combining their erudition in the external sciences (‘ulūm al-ẓāhir) with the 
insight of those endowed with the subtle knowledge of the inner sciences 
(‘ulūm al-bāṭin). The controversy whether or not it is licit in Islam to make 
recourse to different kinds of contraception in different circumstances and 
family-planning at large has been, still remains and probably will remain 
a disputed issue among Muslim scholars in South Asia and in the Islamic 
world at large. From what emerges by looking at the different positions 
held by different authorities in different historical and, perhaps, cultural 
contexts, the more generally prohibitive stances are often made by those 
who use this issue in the context of political and/or ideological discourse, 
96 Dähnhardt. Divine Sanction and Human Intervention
Annali di Ca’ Foscari. Serie orientale, 52, pp. 81-98 ISSN 2385-3042
voicing their opinion in front of a general public and in the context of a 
public debate that is meant to preserve what is understood to be a set 
of Islamic values perceived as being under treat now as in the past from 
forces seen as hostile to Islam and Muslims. 
It does therefore come as no surprise that the present investigation has 
led us to identify and point out the thread of continuity subsisting between 
the positions of intellectual heavyweights of the past, such as al-Ghazālī, 
and those of the present, such as the revered twentieth century Naqsh-
bandi shaykh at Delhi. As authoritative representatives of their respective 
times, although separated by almost a millennium, they stand committed 
to put their balanced judgement and expertise in the manifold branches 
of knowledge (‘ilm) to the service of addressing and answering the urgent 
problems of mankind through the lenses of perpetual actuality. In this 
perspective, they represent the middle way that quite naturally shuns 
any kind of extremism born out of superficiality and ignorance, the root 
of every kind of fundamentalism. 
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